Catholic University Law Review
Volume 17

Issue 2

Article 4

1967

Transparent-Wrap – The Continuing Case for Grant-Back
Agreements
Catholic University Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview

Recommended Citation
Catholic University Law Review, Transparent-Wrap – The Continuing Case for Grant-Back Agreements, 17
Cath. U. L. Rev. 228 (1968).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol17/iss2/4

This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu.

COMMENT/ Transparent-Wrap-TheContinuing Case
for Grant-Back Agreements

Grant-back agreements are covenants, included in a patent license,' which
generally provide for the "license or assignment to the licensor of any improvement patented by the licensee in the products or processes of the licensed patent." 2 Consequently, a patent which represents a major technological advance may give the owner an important competitive advantage. By
utilization of a grant-back agreement the owner of this patent can acquire
rights to all the improvements thereto which are subsequently patented, and
may thereby significantly strengthen his competitive position.8 Twenty years
ago, in Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co.,4 the Supreme Court held that patent grant-back agreements were not illegal per se
and unenforceable under the antitrust and patent laws. 5 The legality of
grant-back agreements was subsequently recognized by the Supreme Court
in two other cases; 6 since the Transparent-Wrapcase was handed down, the
Court has never altered its stand on grant-back agreements.
1. The owner of a patent has the exclusive right to its use and no one can use the patent
without his permission for seventeen years. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1964). A patent license is a
grant from the owner, the licensor, to another, the licensee, to use the patent. The normal
patent license takes the form of a contract between the licensor and licensee in which the
licensee is granted permission to use the patent in return for royalties or similar consideration. The term "license" as used here includes both licenses and assignments of patent
rights. See generally A. WALKER, PATENTS § 380, at 536 (2d ed. A. Deller 1965).
2. REPORT OF THE AT-rY GEN'S NAT'L COMM. TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws, at 227 (1955)
[herein after cited as 1955 REPORT].
3.An improvement patent may, like a patent on a step in a process, have great strategic
value. For it may, on expiration of the basic patent, be the key to a whole technology.
One who holds it may therefore have a considerable competitive advantage. And one
who assigns it and thereby loses negative command of the art may by reason of his assignment have suffered a real competitive handicap.
Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 642 (1947).
4. 329 U.S. 637 (1947).
5. Id. at 648.
6. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948); United States v. National
Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947). In these cases the Supreme Court affirmed without comment
that part of the decree of the lower courts which allowed the use of grant-back agreements.
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The seeming lack of attention given grant-back agreements led two authors ten years ago to comment that in the "shifting sands of antitrust law...
[the law of grant-back agreements] has... shown a refreshing degree of stability."' 7 The same may be said today.8 The validity of Transparent-Wrap,
however, is still a viable issue 9 and the purpose of this comment is to determine if it is, in fact, a sound decision and to draw some tentative conclusions
concerning Transparent-Wrap and grant-back agreements.
Transparent-Wrapis the only case in which the Supreme Court considered the validity of grant-back agreements. There, pursuant to the purchase
of a business, the vendee, Transparent-Wrap Corp., received an exclusive
license to use a group of patents on a machine which was trade-marked
"Transwrap." The license contained a grant-back agreement whereby
Transparent-Wrap (licensee) agreed to assign its improvement patents on the
machine to Stokes 9: Smith (licensor) for inclusion in the group of patents
covered by the license. The term of the license was for ten years, with an
option in the licensee to renew it for five year periods during the life of any
of the patents in the group, including improvements subsequently acquired. 0
Since Transparent-Wrap's improvement patents were assigned to Stokes &
Smith, it was forced to renew its licensing agreement with Stokes & Smith
until all the patents expired. Every time Transparent-Wrap patented an
improvement, it extended the period of time for which a license was
necessary.
In finding that the agreement was not illegal per se, the Court considered
7. Linowitz & Simmons, Antitrust Aspects of Grant Back Clauses in License Agreements,
43 CoRNnL L.Q. 217 (1957).
8. See, e.g., Old Dominion Box Co. v. Continental Can Co., 155 U.S.P.Q. 70 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 811 (S.D. Tex. 1966).
9. Mr. Donald Turner, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division,
in an address before the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association on August 10,
1965, indicated that the government would seek to overrule Transparent-Wrap. Turner.
Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 29 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 187-88 (1965).
10. The relevant portions of the license agreement are:
If the Licensee shall discover or invent an improvement which is applicable to the
Transwrap Packaging Machine and suitable for use in connection therewith and applicable to the making and closing of the package, but not to the filling nor to the contents
of the package, it shall submit the same to the Licensor, which may, at its option, apply for Letters Patent covering the same. In the event of the failure of the Licensor so
to apply for Letters Patent covering such additional improvements, inventions or patentable ideas, the Licensee may apply for the same. In the event that such additional
Letters Patent are applied for and are granted to the Licensor, they shall be deemed
covered by the terms of this License Agreement and may be used by the Licensee
hereunder without any further consideration, license fee or royalty as above provided.
In the event that any such additional improvements are patented by the Licensee for
use in connection with Transwrap Packaging Machines, (after the refusal or failure of
the Licensor to apply for Patents thereon), the Licensor may, nevertheless, have the
use but not the exclusive use of the same outside of the several territories covered by
this License Agreement. The expenses of obtaining any such Patents shall be paid by
the party applying therefor.
Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., supra note 4, at 639 n.l.
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three issues: do grant-back agreements violate the patent law tie-in doctrine;
do these agreements reduce the licensee's incentive to invent; and, most importantly from the standpoint of the case law which followed, are grant-back
agreements a per se violation of the antitrust law? In order to determine
whether or not Transparent-Wrapwas a sound decision, each of these issues
must be analyzed.
Patent Tie-In Doctrine
The patent law tie-in doctrine arises out of a long series of cases beginning
with the Motion PicturePatents Co. case in 1917."1 These cases hold that "an
owner of a patent may not condition a license [of the patent] so as to tie to the
use of the patent the use of other materials, processes or devices which lie outside the monopoly of the patent."' 2 The Court, in Transparent-Wrap,relied
on the patent assignment statute 3 to show that grant-back agreements do not
violate this doctrine. In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that a
grant-back agreement was an agreement to purchase future patent rights.
The presently existing patent rights which were being purchased were but
part of the consideration for this purchase. The Court bolstered its position
by showing that, by statute, patent rights are property rights and are there4
fore valid consideration for a contract.'
If the Court had stopped there, the logical result of the decision would
have been to overrule the patent tie-in cases.15 By the terms of the grant-back
agreement in Transparent-Wrap, Stokes & Smith conditioned the license of
the patents so as to tie to the use of the original patents the use of future patents which might be acquired and which thereby lie outside the monopoly of
the original patents. Indeed, Judge Learned Hand, using similar reasoning
in the lower court decision, found the grant-back agreement violated the
doctrine of the tie-in cases.' 6
The Supreme Court, however, attempted to distinguish TransparentWrap from the tie-in cases, stating that the latter were limited to the tying
of the use of unpatented articles to the use of a patent, whereas grant-back
agreements only tie patents. The Court found that the acquisition of patents
11. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). See also
Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931); Morton Salt
Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co.,
320 U.S. 661 (1944); Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis Honeywell-Regulator Co., 320 U.S.
680 (1944). Patent tie-in agreements should be distinguished from tie-in agreements forbidden by Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964). See Stedman, Acquisition of Patents and Know How by Grant, Fraud, Purchase, and Grant Back,
27 U. Pr. L. REV. 161, 168-72 (1966).
12. Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., supra note 4, at 640.
13. 35 U.S.C. § 47 (Supp. V, 1946), recodified in 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1964).
14. Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., supra note 4, at 642-43.
15. See cases cited supra note 11.
16. Stokes & Smith Co. v. Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp., 156 F.2d 198, 203 (2d Cir.
1946).
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in this manner was legal, since the owner of a patent is merely "using one
legalized monopoly to acquire another legalized monopoly."17 The importance of this distinction is evident, in that the tie-in doctrine is a logical consequence of the public policy against monopolies.' 8 It recognizes that while
patents are statutory exceptions to this policy, a patent may not be used to
obtain a monopoly which is greater than that granted by the patent. The
tying of an unpatented article to the use of a patent is lending the sanction
of a legal monopoly, i.e., the patent, to an unpatented article. The owner of
the patent thereby acquires something resembling a monopoly on the unpatented article, a monopoly neither sanctioned by the law nor favored by
public policy.
If the patent tie-in doctrine were limited only to preventing the monopolization of unpatented articles, as the Court held, their distinction would be
sound. But the policy behind the tie-in doctrine would seem to run deeper;
it seeks to limit the patent holder to the "four comers of his patents."' 9 The
apparent fallaciousness of the Court's distinction was recognized earlier in
Ethyl Gasoline20 where the Supreme Court stated: "[t]he patent monopoly
of one invention may no more be enlarged for the exploitation of a monopoly
of another.., than for the exploitation of an unpatented article ....21 Ethyl
Gasoline was followed by similar decisions. 22 Although these cases have been
interpreted as merely preventing the use of one patent to compel the use or
recognition of another patent,23 they cast serious doubt on the soundness of
Transparent-Wrap.
The questionable soundness of the Court's reasoning on this issue has
24
recently led one party in Atlas Scraper & Engineering Co. v. Pursche to
attack a grant-back, objecting that the agreement was an unlawful tie-in. The
issue, however, was untimely raised and the suit was dismissed.2 5 This objection would also appear to be a ground upon which the Assistant Attorney26
General would base his attack on Transparent-Wrap.
17. Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., supranote 4, at 644.
18. As a matter of public policy, the common law prohibited or treated as illegal all contracts or acts which were unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions. See Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911). This policy has been manifested in the various antitrust laws enacted by Congress.
19. Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co. supra note 11.
20. Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940).
21. Id. at 459.
22. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); Technograph
Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Bendix Corp., 327 F.2d 497 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 379 U.S. 826
(1964).
23. See Pugsley, Antitrust and Misuse Aspects of Licensing Patents and Know-How, in
PATENT LAW DEVELOPMENTS

162 (1964).

24. 357 F.2d 296 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966).
25. Id. at 298. See also Chevigny, The Validity of Grant-Back Agreements Under the Antitrust Laws, 34 FORDHAM L. REV. 569, 574 (1966).
26. In his address to the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association on August
10, 1965, Mr. Donald Turner said:
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Incentive To Invent
The purpose of the patent law is to promote the progress of "[s]cience and the
useful [a]rts." 2 7 Counsel for Transparent-Wrap argued that the enforcement
of the grant-back agreement decreased its incentive to develop new inventions, was violative of the very purpose of the patent law, and should therefore not be enforced. This argument was best stated by Judge Hand in the
lower court, when he noted that the effect of the license would be to force
the licensee "either to cease all efforts to patent improvements, or to keep
renewing the [license] in order to escape the consequences of its own ingenuity."128 The Supreme Court summarily dealt with this issue by showing that
benefits did acrue to Transparent-Wrap as a result of obtaining improvement
patents. It dismissed further discussion of the issue by stating that TransparentWrap's incentive to invent depended on "vicissitudes of business too con29
jectural on this record to appraise."
The soundness of the Court's reasoning on this point is questionable. It is
hard to imagine a more clear-cut example of the incentive to invent being
affected. Competition is a prime basis of incentive. As long as the grant-back
agreement stands, there can be no competition-between the licensor and
the licensee-arising out of improvements developed by the licensee. As one
author has stated: "If one assumes that part of the incentive for invention
comes from the patent right to exclude others from using the claimed invention, over and above the right to derive revenue from licensing, an agreement involving the interchange of future patents must, to some degree, reduce
this incentive."'8 0 Each time Transparent-Wrap patented an improvement,
it extended the life of the grant-back agreement which, by its terms, did
not expire until all the improvement patents had terminated. Clearly,
Transparent-Wrap's incentive to promote the art was affected by the grantback albatross which hung about its neck.
Any corporation which enters into a grant-back agreement will, in effect,
be committing itself to working for the licensor, as well as itself, if it seeks to
develop and patent improvements on a licensed patent. This fact must have
some negative effect on a corporation's decision to "promote the science or
useful art" of the patents involved in grant-back license agreements. In Line
We shall ... eventually seek to establish, contrary to Trans-Wrap,that a clause in a patent license requiring the licensee to grant back to the patentee all future improvement
patents should be held unlawful per se for the simple reason that it is much more restrictive than necessary to protect the patentee's legitimate interests.
Turner, supra note 9, at 188.
27. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.

28. Stokes & Smith Co. v. Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp., supra note 16, at 203.
29. Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., supra note 4, at 646.
30. Gallo, Patent Interchanges: an Analysis of their Effects on Competition, 48 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'y 669, 678 (1966).
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Material,s ' the Court invalidated the cross-licensing agreement, whereby
each company granted licenses to each of the others on their respective patents. In rendering its decision, the Court stated that the stimulus to seek
competitive inventions was reduced. 2 If cross-licensing agreements reduce
the stimulus to seek competitive inventions, so too do grant-backs.
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa)33 represents the best
example of the effect of grant-back agreements on the stimulus to invent.
As a result of a prior adjudication of monopolization, 34 Alcoa agreed to license certain patents. In the five years that followed, Kaiser Aluminum Co.
and Reynolds Metal Co. entered into license agreements with Alcoa. The
licenses contained a non-exclusive grant-back agreement, whereby the licensees had to grant back improvement patents to Alcoa. The second case
arose out of a proceeding to determine how to increase competition in the
aluminum industry. Finding that the grant-back agreements substantially
contributed to Alcoa's dominance of the industry, the court reasoned that
if one competitor patented an improvement, the innovator and Alcoa could
use the patent, to the exclusion of the other competitor. As a matter of
simple mathematics, since Alcoa was taking from both competitors and the
competitors were taking only from themselves, Alcoa's patent position would
continue to be larger than either of the others. 5 The logical consequence
would be for Kaiser and Reynolds to limit patent development. The court
found that in 1949 this had indeed happened, for Alcoa employed 762 employees in research while Kaiser and Reynolds employed only a combined
total of 88.36
As with the tie-in cases, the soundness of the Court's reasoning in
Transparent-Wrapappears to falter. It must be noted, however, that there the
Court did not close the door on this approach, but indicated that the decision was limited by the record before it; it lacked evidence as to the adverse
effect of the grant-back agreement on Transparent-Wrap's incentive to invent.
Antitrust Violations
The final issue considered in Transparent-Wrap-that the grant-back
agreement violated the antitrust laws-has given rise to the greatest amount
of litigation. The circuit court had not considered this issue. The Supreme
Court remanded, holding: "the inclusion in the license of the condition re31.
32.
33.
34.

United States v. Line Material Co., supra note 6.
Id. at 311.
91 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1950)
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).

35. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), supra note 33, at 409-10.

36. Id. at 410. This figure must be tempered by the fact that Alcoa was worth about

three times the value of Kaiser and Reynolds.
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quiring the licensee to assign improvement patents is not per se illegal and
unenforceable."3 7 The Court did note that a patent may be used to violate
the antitrust laws. In addition, it recognized that, in the proper setting,
grant-back agreements may give rise to violations of the antitrust laws.
Here, the Court's reasoning was sound. The policy of the antitrust laws
is to foster competition; grant-back agreements, properly used, may in fact
achieve this end. This issue has proved to be the most viable factor in grantback agreements. Any determination of Transparent-Wrap'ssoundness and
the legality of grant-back agreements would be shallow without a careful
analysis of this area.
A grant-back agreement, by its terms, limits competition for improvement
patents between the parties to the agreement and expands the monopoly of
the licensor.38 In the words of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, a grantback is a contract in restraint of trade and is an attempt to monopolize.3 9
However, under the oft-quoted "rule of reason," only unreasonable violations of the antitrust laws are forbidden. 40 It is with this issue that the courts
41
have struggled.
42
The Hartford-Empire
case is the one decision cited by the Court in
Transparent-Wrap to illustrate how grant-back agreements may be used in
violation of the antitrust laws. Hartford-Empire involved companies which
controlled 94 percent of the glass container manufacturing business. Grantback agreements effectively enabled control of all the patents of these companies. With this control, the companies divided the market for containers,
set production quotas for each company, and zealously discouraged competi37. Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., supra note 4, at 648.
38. There is no competition between the two parties in the improvement patents once
the agreement is signed; and a licensor who receives a license on an improvement patent has
a "double monopoly," a monopoly for his first patent and a monopoly for the improvement.
See Stokes & Smith Co. v. Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp., 161 F.2d 565, 567 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 837 (1947).
39. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964). The Sections substantially provide:
§ 1. Every contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce...
is hereby declared to be illegal.
§ 2. Every person who shall monopolize . . . any part of... trade or commerce . . . shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor....
40. The "rule of reason" was first enunciated in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1 (1911), and was most succinctly stated in Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288
U.S. 344, 360 (1933), where the Court, in speaking of the Sherman Act, said, "Its general
phrases, interpreted to attain its fundamental objects, set up the essential standard of reasonableness." See generally 1955 REPORT, supra note 2, at 5-12.
41. Grant-back agreements have been involved in findings of Sherman 1 violations. See
United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); United States v.
General Elec. Co., 80 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). Grant-back agreements have also permitted a monopolization of patents in violation of Sherman 2. See United States v. General
Elec. Co. (Lamps), 115 F. Supp. 835, 847 (D.N.J. 1953); United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America (Alcoa), supra note 33, at 409-10; United States v. General Elec. Co. (Lamps), 82 F.
Supp. 753, 815-16 (D.N.J. 1949).
42. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
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tion. 43 The Court found that there was an unreasonable restraint of trade
4
and monopolization in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
The use of grant-back agreements by the companies was forbidden.
In the Line Material45 and National Lead46 cases, decided subsequent to
Transparent-Wrap, the Supreme Court found that the companies had unreasonably restrained trade in violation of the Sherman Act. In these cases,
however, the Supreme Court sanctioned the use of grant-back agreements.
In both instances, the Court recognized that the companies involved had,
by their patents, obtained control of virtually 100 percent of the market to
which the patents related. It noted, however, that in National Lead there
was no suppression of competition and there was, in fact, active competition
between the companies. 4 7 In Line Material, the Court recognized that the
companies entered into the violative agreements only when faced with possible infringement suits. 48 In both cases, there was no reasonable substitute
for the patented products, and it was necessary for the companies to have
rights under the patents in order to enter the field. The effect of the grantback agreements was not to unreasonably restrain competition and the
Court did not forbid their use.
Transparent-Wrap and Hartford-Empire indicate that if the effect of
grant-back agreements is to lead to unreasonable violations of the Sherman
Act, the agreements must be voided. National Lead and Line Material, paying due consideration to the rule of reason, indicate that those agreements
whose effect is reasonable will be upheld.
Reasonableness is an elusive issue, however, and the lower courts have
turned to the terms of the grant-back agreements in search of a meaningful
standard for establishing the competitive effect of the agreements. Grantback agreements have been classified as exclusive or non-exclusive. 49 Exclusive agreements encompass assignment grant-back agreements, and arise
when the licensee may give rights to improvement patents only to the licensor. 50 Under an assignment grant-back, the licensee gives title to the licensor, usually retaining a license for himself. In a non-exclusive agreement,
the licensee may license others in addition to the licensor.
The exclusive agreements have been the most carefully considered. In
United States v. General Electric (Carboloy),51 four companies owned, and
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 392-400, 406.
Id. at 392, 435.
United States v. Line Material Co., supra note 6.
United States v. National Lead Co., supra note 6.
Id. at 347-48.
United States v. Line Material Co., supra note 6, at 292-93.
1955 REPORT, supra note 2, at 228-29.
Id. at 229.
80 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
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acquired by assignment, grant-back agreement patents which gave them
control of the entire field of hard metal compositions. This control was, in
turn, maintained by the grant-back agreements. The express purpose of
these agreements was to restrain competition, to fix prices, to divide terri52
torial markets, and to boycott those companies that did not take licenses.
The grant-back agreements provided one of the means by which competition was unreasonably restrained, and were condemned per se by the court
54
because of the scale of competition restrained. 5s In Hartford-Empire,
discussed previously, assignment grant-back agreements were condemned by
the Court.
The competitive effect of exclusive grant-back agreements is twofold. On
one side, the license containing the grant-back increases the number of licensees who can use the basic patent, and consequently increases the competition
in the use of the basic patent. On the other side, the exclusive agreement may
limit the competition in the use of the improvement patents to only the licensor and the licensee. Therefore, the courts have not been willing to find exclusive agreements to be illegal per se, in the absence of a showing of unreasonable restraint or monopolization. Transparent-Wrap involved an assignment grant-back agreement. On remand, the court of appeals recognized this
twofold aspect and dismissed the action on the grounds that there was an insufficient showing of the effect of the agreements on competition. 55
The necessity of establishing restraint of competition was recently borne
out in Swofford v. B & W, Inc.,56 where it was argued that assignment grantback agreements were illegal per se. No evidence as to the effect of the agreements on competition was presented. The court, citing Transparent-Wrap,
57
upheld the validity of the agreement.
An exclusive grant-back agreement is given closer attention than a nonexclusive because, as was seen in the Carboloy case, its effect can be to give
control of the improvement patents to the holder of the basic patent. This,
in turn, may materially strengthen the holder's patent position, and enhance
his opportunity to restrain trade and monopolize the field covered by his
patents. The only competition in the use of the improvement patent may be
between the licensor and licensee. All others may be shut out by the terms of
the agreements. In fact, if the agreement is an assignment grant-back, the
licensee may be left without permission to make the improvement, and con52.
53.
54.
55.
cert.

Id. at 1015.
Id. at 1006.
Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, supra note 42.
Stokes & Smith Co. v. Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp., 161 F.2d 565, 567 (2d Cir.),
denied, 331 U.S. 837 (1947).

56. 251 F. Supp. 811 (S.D. Tex. 1966).
57. Id. at 821. See also Old Dominion Box Co. v. Continental Can Co., 155 U.S.P.Q. 70
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); Stewart-Warner Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 143 U.S.P.Q. 211

(W.D.N.Y. 1964).
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sequently there is no competition for the improvement. No determination of
the effect of any grant-back agreement on such competition can be made,
however, until an improvement is first discovered and its value assessed. If
the improvements that may subsequently be patented prove to be of little or
no value, the grant-back agreements will have created no unreasonable restraints or monopolizations. Any adverse effects on competition may in turn
be balanced by the increase in competition in the basic patent created by the
license. The courts in Transparent-Wrap and Swofford correctly recognized
that assignments cannot be invalidated under the Sherman Act without a
showing of their effect on competition.
With a non-exclusive agreement, the licensee can license others and effectively stimulate competition in the use of the improvement patents. The
difference between the two agreements was noted in United States v. Huck
Manufacturing Co.,58 which involved the use of a non-exclusive grant-back
agreement. There, the Huck Company obtained patents for lockbolts. These
bolts represented a substantial improvement over ordinary rivets and their
sale amounted to $16 million annually.59 Huck was unable to meet the demand for the bolts and entered into a non-exclusive grant-back agreement
with the Townsand Manufacturing Co. The court found that the effect of
the agreement was neither to restrain competition nor to provide power for
monopolization but on the contrary, the effect was to foster competition."0
The court emphasized that Townsand was free to make, sell, and use the items
covered by the improvement patent and could license others to do likewise.
The effect of the agreement was to increase competition in the improvement
patent.
The mere use of a non-exclusive license, however, will not save a company
from antitrust prosecution. Thus, in the General Electric (Lamps)61 case, a
non-exclusive grant-back agreement was involved. The court found that the
grant-back agreement formed part of a patent acquisition policy the effect of
which was to perpetuate control over light bulbs long after the expiration of
the basic patents, thereby "regimenting" the entire industry and unreasonably restraining competition. 62 Nor did a non-exclusive license save Alcoa's
grant-back agreement in the Alcoa case discussed previously.68
The major reason that the non-exclusive grant-back agreements were struck
down in these cases was not that the agreements of themselves decreased com58.
59.
60.
(N.D.
1961).
61.
62.
63.

227 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Mich. 1964), af'd on other grounds, 382 U.S. 197 (1965).
Id. at 794.
Id. at 804. See also Sperry Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 171 F. Supp. 901
Ohio 1959); Well Surveys, Inc. v. McCullough Tool Co., 199 F. Supp. 374 (N.D. Okla.
United States v. General Elec. Co. (Lamps), 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949).
Id. at 815-16.
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), supra note 33.
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petition, but that they were the tools by which General Electric and Alcoa
perpetuated their patent supremacy.
The Huck case shows that the effect of a non-exclusive agreement, in contradistinction to the exclusive agreement, may be to spread the benefits of the
improvement patent and decrease the concentration of the patent monopolies. 64 This, in turn, furthers the purpose of the antitrust law. The courts do
not routinely approve non-exclusive agreements. If evidence is introduced,
as it was in General Electric and Alcoa, to show unreasonable restraint or
monopolization, the courts will strike them down.
The most interesting aspect of the lower courts' inquiry into grant-back
agreements are those instances where the courts have recognized that either
exclusive or non-exclusive grant-backs can lead to a substantial increase in
competition. International Nickel Co.65 best illustrates this aspect. International Nickel (INCO) patented a new method of alloying steel, a method
vastly superior to the prior process. INCO entered into a number of licensing
agreements which contained grant-back covenants, whereby INCO obtained
the right to license all improvement patents. INCO itself did not utilize this
process. Its express purpose in obtaining the improvement patents was to
increase the value of its license and to thus stimulate others to obtain licenses
from it.66 The license agreements were to terminate upon the expiration of
INCO's basic patent. The court recognized that the effect of this agreement
was to markedly increase, and not decrease, competition, and was therefore
67
legal and reasonable.
A new line of attack on grant-back agreements has recently been espoused.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act 68 forbids the acquisition of the assets of one corporation by another, where the effects of the acquisition would tend to restrain trade or to create a monopoly. Mergers have generally been attacked
under this section. 69 This argument holds patents to be assets within the
meaning of Section 7.70 If this is so, and the effect of the acquisition of a pat64. See also Binks Mfg. Co. v. Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp., 281 F.2d 252, 259 (7th
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 211 (1961).
65. International Nickel Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 166 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
66. Id. at 566.
67. See also Lyophile-Cryochem Corp. v. Cutter Labs., 78 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Cal. 1948).
68. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
69. See cases cited note 73 infra.
70. In an address before the Second Annual Antitrust Institute in Pittsburg, Pa., on Nov.
4, 1966, Mr. Donald Turner, Asst. Att'y. Gen. in Charge of Antitrust, said: "I assume and I
think that it is a completely safe assumption that.., a patent [is an] asset within the meaning of Section 7 [of the Clayton Act]." Support for this position may be found in Section
1235 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. This section generally states that a transfer
(other than by gift, inheritance, or devise) of rights to a patent is considered to be the sale
or exchange of a capital asset held for more than six months. Further support may be
found in Section 1231 of the Internal Revenue Act of 1954. See also Armco Steel Corp. v.
United States, 263 F. Supp. 749 (S.D. Ohio 1966); Bell Intercontinental Corp. v. United
States, 152 U.S.P.Q. 182 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
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ent or group of patents tends to lessen competition or to monopolize, then it
could be attacked under Clayton 7. If this acquisition is by grant-back agreement then the agreement will be illegal. 71 The importance of this argument
is that under the classical structuring of the antitrust laws the burden of proof
needed to establish a violation of Clayton 7 is substantially less than that
needed to establish a violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.7 2 Under Clayton 7, an actual restraint of trade or monopolization need not be
shown; only a tendency in those directions must be proven. The government
73
has had notable success with this section.
Even under this new theory, however, more than the existence of a grantback agreement must be shown. Ability to restrain competition and monopolize depends on many things, including corporate size and market position.
Absent such a showing, a grant-back agreement will be legal. This theory does
not detract from the soundness of the Court's holding in Transparent-Wrap
that grant-back agreements are not illegal per se.
The cases, as well as the discussion of Clayton 7, are persuasive support of
the Court's reasoning in Transparent-Wrapthat grant-back agreements are
not per se violations of the antitrust law. While the Hartford-Empire and
General Electric cases are evidence of the anticompetitive effects of grantback agreements, the Huck and InternationalNickel situations demonstrate
their useful effects and show that a per se rule would vitiate a potentially
effective competitive tool.
Conclusion
The issue at hand is the substantive validity of Transparent-Wrap.The underlying consideration is the legality of grant-back agreements. TransparentWrap derives its significance from its connection with the antitrust laws and
any conclusion as to its soundness must be structured to reflect this
relationship.
If the case is viewed from the standpoint of efficacy, it must be said that the
decision is sound for it has proved workable. The Court's holding that grantbacks do not per se restrain competition or monopolize has been borne out
by the case law. It has been clearly shown that the effect of grant-back agreements may further the purposes of the antitrust laws by increasing competition. From this viewpoint, the Court's reasoning is eminently sound; in the
appropriate setting grant-back agreements will be sustained.
Theoretically, however, Transparent-Wrappresents a problem. From this
71. Stedman, Acquisition of Patents and Know How by Grant, Fraud, Purchase and
Grant-back, 27 U. Prrr. L. REv. 161, 168-72 (1966).
72. H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 5-12 (1949), reprinted in C. OPPENHEIMER,
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW, CASES AND COMMENTS 551 (2d ed. 1964).
73. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v. Pabst
Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
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standpoint, there is little difference between tying an unpatentable article to
a patented article; this is probably what the Court was thinking of in the
Ethyl case.7 4 If this is viewed from an efficable point, however, there is a major
difference. No new monopoly is created by a grant-back agreement. It only
involves the transfer of a previously sanctioned monopoly, i.e., an improvement patent. This acquisition is within the bounds of a legally sanctioned
monopoly and does not attempt to monopolize unpatented articles which
clearly fall outside the realm of the patent. If the theoretical argument is sustained, all grant-backs would be invalid. However, as these agreements have
moved to be competitive stimulants, the efficacy argument should hold sway.
The incentive issue is often moot. Thus, in Alcoa the grant-back agreements were voided not because they detracted from Kaiser's and Reynolds'
incentive to invent, but because of its anticompetitive effects. In many cases,
this will be the result, and the court will not reach the issue.
The issue does have practical as well as theoretical value in a situation such
as presented in Transparent-Wrap. Under the grant-back agreement used,
it was to the decided advantage of Transparent-Wrap to stop inventing.
Incentive to invent is an elusive factor and there are many considerations
to be taken into account. The most important of these is the caliber and quantity of the competition. If the grant-back agreement involves a patent in a
highly competitive area, the licensee must constantly innovate to keep pace
with the competition. Another important factor is the type of grant-back
agreement entered into. If the licensee receives royalties from the licensor for
the improvement patents or if the agreement is non-exclusive and the licensee can sublicense the improvement patents, he may be in a position to obtain
substantial financial reward. His incentive to invent will therefore be stimulated by the grant-back agreement which put him in the position to discover these improvements. 75, The final consideration is the actual effect of
patents on the incentive to invent. A recent congressional report estimated
that less than 20 percent of the inventions made in America were patent motivated and ranged as low as 0.5 percent for some industries. 76
Grant-back agreements can reduce a licensee's incentive to invent. However, if a licensee seeks to have the agreement voided on this issue, evidence
establishing the effects of the above considerations must be produced. Absent this evidence, a licensee may find himself out of court for presenting an
77
issue "too conjectural on [the] record to appraise."
74.
75.
Ass'N
76.

See text supra at note 20, for discussion of the Ethyl case.
See text supra at note 58, for discussion of the Huck case. See also AM. PAT. LAW

BULL. 392-96 (1966).
STAFF JOINT ECONOM. COMM., 88th Cong., 2d Sess., INVENTION AND THE PATENT SYSTEM,
at 50, 51 (1964). See also STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.,
STUDY No. 11, THE IMPACT OF THE PATENT SYSTEM ON RESEARCH (1958).

77. Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 646 (1947).
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Transparent-Wrapis sound. The Court's failure to distinguish the Ethyl
case does not detract from its logic. Grant-back agreements can stimulate competition and can implement the policy of antitrust legislation. The efficacy
of Transparent-Wraphas been established. The continued stability of grantback agreements should be encouraged, and not subverted.

